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INTERNATIONAL LAW-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-STATE COURT AUTHORITY 
To DETERMINE TITLE To PROPERTY UNDER ITs JURISDICTION DESPITE A 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUGGESTION OF IMMUNITY-In 1952 plaintiff brought 
a creditor's action for the appointment of a permanent receiver for the 
assets of the defendant located in New York. Defendant, Zivnostenska 
Banka, was a Czechoslovak corporation that had at one time been engaged 
in banking activities in New York. Plaintiff succeeded in having a re-
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ceiver appointedl upon proving that defendant had been nationalized, 
contrary to New York policy and law,2 by a 1950 decree of the Czecho-
slovak Government which had merged the defendant and its assets with 
the State Bank of Czechoslovakia. The instant controversy arose when the 
receiver attempted to set aside, as a fraud upon creditors, a transfer of 
funds made by the defendant to the State Bank in accordance with the 
1950 nationalization decree. The State Department filed a suggestion of 
immunity with the lower court in which it "recognized and allowed"3 
that the Czechoslovak Government held title to the disputed property, 
apparently on the basis that the property was in the name of Czechoslo-
vakia's recognized agent, the State Bank. The lower court did not accept 
the State Department suggestion and gave judgment for the plaintiff.• 
Upon appeal to the appellate division, held, affirmed, one judge dissenting. 
The determination of title to property in the custody of a state court is a 
judicial function which is not precluded by a State Department suggestion 
of immunity "recognizing and allowing" that title is in a foreign sovereign. 
Stephens v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat'l Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d · 111, 222 
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961). 
The decision in the principal case revives the controversy as to the 
degree of control that the State Department exercises over litigation in 
which the defendant claims sovereign immunity. In recent years, until 
the principal case, there had been a general acquiescence by the courts 
in suggestions of immunity filed by the State Department.5 This acqui-
escence had its roots in three opinions by Mr. Chief Justice Stone.6 He 
had asserted, in dicta, that a State Department suggestion of immunity 
which "recognized and allowed" a foreign government's claim to immunity 
would be conclusive upon the courts.7 As a result, the courts were to 
1 Stephens v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat'l Corp., 155 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 
2 App. Div. 2d 958, 157 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1956), afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 862, 145 N.E.2d 889, 166 
N.Y.S.2d 309 (1957), appeal dismissed, 356 U.S. 22 (1958). 
% N.Y. CIV. PllAc. Acr § 977-b; Bollack v. Societe Generale, 263 App. Div. 601, 33 
N.Y.S.2d 986 (1942). 
8 A claim of sovereign immunity can be presented to the court directly by the 
accredited ambassadorial representative of a foreign government or by the State De-
partment at the request of the foreign government. The State Department has the 
choice either to present the claim "without comment or argument," or to "recognize 
and allow" the claim. Only in the case of a recognition and allowance of immunity 
has it been contended that the suggestion of immunity presented by the State Depart• 
ment would be conclusive on the courts. See generally Lyons, The Conclusiveness of 
the Suggestion and Certificate of the American State Department, 24 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 
116 (1947); Note, 20 U. Prrr. L. REv. 126 (1958). 
4 Stephens v. Zivnostenska Banka, Nat'l Corp., 23 Misc. 2d 855, 199 N.Y.S.2d 797 
(Sup. Ct. 1960), afj'd on subsequent motions, 213 N.Y .S.2d 396 (Sup. Ct. 1961). 
5 E.g., New York Be Cuba M.S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959). But 
see Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappij, 289 N.Y. 9, 43 N.E.2d 502 
(1942), and Frazier v. Hanover Bank, 204 Misc. 922, 119 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
6 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 
(1943); Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938). 
7 Ex parte Peru, supra note 6, at 589. 
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dismiss any pending litigation against a foreign government or its recog-
nized agent if this was urged by the State Department. 
It is clear that the considerations behind Stone's position were more 
political than legal. From the standpoint of legal doctrine, it has been 
argued that questions of sovereign immunity necessitate interpretations 
of international law and should, therefore, be confided to the competence 
of the judiciary.8 Indeed, the early Supreme Court decisions dealing with 
sovereign immunity gave no indication that suggestions of immunity from 
the executive branch were considered to be anything more than attempts to 
guide the judiciary in applying international law.9 In one case the Court 
even refused to accept a State Department suggestion that there should 
be no immunity because it was not in compliance with what the Court 
regarded as the then-recognized rule of international law.10 Nevertheless, 
Stone was of the opinion that it would be preferable to give the State 
Department the option to substitute diplomatic negotiations for judicial 
proceedings whenever there was a possibility that the executive branch 
would be "embarrassed" in its conduct of foreign affairs.11 Stone expressed 
little concern either for the rights of plaintiffs whose suits might be dis-
missed or· for the possibility that the State Department would misinterpret 
or misapply international law. Instead, questions of sovereign immunity 
were, in effect, equated to "political questions," i.e., questions dealing 
with policy areas where political consequences are considered so important 
that the courts may neither reconsider nor review the decisions of the 
executive.12 The apparent result was to concede to the executive branch 
the power to dispose of any controversy in which questions of sovereign 
immunity arose. 
Until 1952 it had been the policy of the courts, and the Department of 
Justice, that foreign governments and their agents were entitled to abso-
lute immunity from suit and from execution upon their property.13 No 
distinction was drawn between activities which involved governmental 
functions (iure imperiz) and those which involved private or commercial 
functions (iure gestionis). The advent of large-scale state trading activity, 
especially by the socialistic countries, was influential in inducing the State 
Department to repudiate the "absolute" theory of immunity in favor of 
8 Timberg, Sovereign Immunity, State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 
Nw. U.L. REv. 109, 115 (1961). 
9 Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: "Political Questions," 104 U. PA. 
L. REv. 451, 471-75 (1956). See The Schooner Exchange v. M'faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
116 (1812). 
10 Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926). The State Department posi-
tion is set out in The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
11 Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943). The suggestion in the principal case 
indicated that the United States and Czechoslovakia were negotiating for the settlement 
of claims arising out of the post-war expropriation of American property and that an 
adverse judgment would affect final outcome of the negotiations. Principal case at 
118-19, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36. 
12 Dickinson, supra note 9. 
13 Id. at 472-79. 
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the "restrictive" immunity approach. The "Tate Letter" of mid-1952 set 
forth this new policy,14 indicating that a foreign government or its agent 
would thereafter be subject to the jurisdiction of American courts for all 
acts which were iure gestionis. However, the effectiveness of this new 
policy was diminished by a later State Department interpretation of inter-
national law rules regarding judicial execution on property. Under that 
interpretation, courts could allow only attachment of a sovereign's prop-
erty in order to obtain jurisdiction to determine the rights of the litigants. 
In the case of a judgment adverse to the sovereign, the attached property 
could not be levied upon but would have to be released.15 Apparently 
ultimate satisfaction of a judgment, if forthcoming at all, would then be 
dependent upon a negotiated agreement with the sovereign defendant.16 
With the foregoing as a background, the State Department filed a sug-
gestion of immunity in the principal case, asking that the disputed prop-
erty be given sovereign immunity and not be subjected to execution. The 
apparent basis for the suggestion was that the property was in the name of 
the immune agent of Czechoslovakia, the State Bank, as a result of transfers 
in accordance with the 1950 nationalization decree, and that the true owner, 
therefore, was Czechoslovakia.17 Yet, according to New York law, a transfer 
of New York property pursuant to foreign nationalization decrees was a 
fraud upon creditors and could be judicially set aside.18 Faced with a 
choice between state law and a Department of State suggestion, the appel-
late division chose to reject the suggestion. It found that disputes as to 
the ownership of property within the state had long been recognized as 
a state problem that was litigable in the state courts.19 Since the disputed 
14 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952). See Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting 
Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 93 (1953). The Department of State had un-
succeMfully advanced this same position as far back as 1918; see 2 HACKWORTII, DIGEST 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 429, 437-40 (1941). 
llS Principal case at 116, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 133; Timberg, supra note 8, at 119-22. See 
Dexter&: Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnavagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 
282 U.S. 896 (1931). 
16 This position of the State Department has been condemned for replacing a 
theoretical immunity under the absolute theory with a practical immunity under the 
restrictive theory. Aron, State Trading, Commercial Immunity, and the Jurisdictional 
Risks of International Trade, in EssAYS ON INTER."IATIONAL JURISDICTION 28 (Falk. ed. 1961). 
17 It is difficult to determine the exact basis upon which the State Department con-
sidered the title to be in Czechoslovakia. The court indicated in the principal case at 
119 (222 N.Y.S.2d at 136) that the suggestion did not "purport to recognize the right of 
immunity on the part of defendant or in respect of its property." On this basis it is 
reasonable to assume that Czechoslovakia's title was derived through the State Bank 
which had the property in its name. It should be pointed out, however, that one of the 
attorneys for plaintiff in the principal case took a different view of the suggestion. 
Timberg, Expropriation Measures and State Trading, 55 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 113, 
116 (1961). 
18 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. ACT§ 977-b. 
19 See United States v. Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 463 (1936); Clark v. Willard, 294 
U.S. 211 (1935); Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355, 358 (2d Cir. 1941); Banco De 
Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1940) (court not bound by 
Secretary of the Treasury's interpretation of title question). 
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property had been in the possession of New York depositaries and was, 
after attachment, in the custody of the court, it was the court's position 
that the adjudication of the conflicting claims to the property was a 
judicial function and was governed by state law.20 The State Department 
countered with the proposition that an adjudication which set aside the 
transfer of property to the State Bank would have the effect of an execution 
upon the property of a sovereign in violation of international Iaw.21 The 
court in tum reasoned that any property ultimately subjected to execution 
would be property that had been adjudged to belong to defendant, a cor-
porate jural entity separate and distinct from Czechoslovakia,22 regarding 
which no suggestion of immunity had been given.28 
It is clear that the court's rejection of the State Department's sugges-
tion of immunity was not based upon a complete rejection of State Depart-
ment authority over questions of sovereign immunity. In a companion 
appeal the same court accepted a suggestion of immunity for the defendant 
there, the State Bank involved in the principal case, as a political determi-
nation binding on the court.24 Nevertheless, the court indicated that it was 
unwilling to allow the State Department to dictate the disposition of all the 
issues in a case just because the executive branch had an acknowledged 
power over questions of sovereign immunity. The decision in the principal 
case was therefore directed at the scope of executive power, but not at the 
existence of the power itself. 
Although the extent to which State Department suggestions of im-
munity are conclusive on the courts has often been debated by legal 
scholars,25 it has never been adequately delineated by the courts.28 As a 
minimum, it would probably be uncontroverted that the determination of 
20 Compare Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 824 U.S. SO (1945) (no possession by 
sovereign, no recognition and allowance of immunity by the State Department); Loomis 
v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 859 U.S. 928 (1959) (no possession by 
the sovereign and no recognition and allowance by the State Department, but immunity 
granted because title was clearly in the sovereign); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba S.A., 197 
F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), afj'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) (possession by sovereign and 
recognition and allowance of immunity by the State Department). 
21 When the doctrine of absolute immunity was in effect the property of a sovereign 
could not be executed upon, but whether this is still a rule adopted by a majority of 
countries has been questioned. See REsTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 55, Reporter's 
Note, at 184 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958); Note, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 167 (1961). Cf. Harris &: 
Co. Advertising v. Republic of Cuba, 127 So. 2d 687 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). But see 
Setser, The Immunities of the State and Government Economic Activities, 24 LAW &: 
CONTEMP. PROB. 291, 808-09 (1959). 
22 Principal case at 118, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 185. See Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania 
Monopolies Institute, 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1940). 
23 Principal case at 120, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 187. 
24 Wolchok v. Statni Banka Ceskoslovenska, 15 App. Div. 2d 108, 222 N.Y.S.2d 140 
(1961). 
25 E.g., Lyons, supra note S; Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Iu 
Functions?, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946). 
26 Compare Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 824 U.S. SO (1945), with United States 
of Mexico v. Schmuck, 294 N.Y. 265, 62 N.E.2d 64 (1945) and Frazier v. Hanover Bank, 
204 Misc. 422, 119 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
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the status of a foreign state or government is a "political question" prop-
erly left to the executive branch.27 Hence, if the State Department were 
to limit its suggestions to a recognition of a sovereign government's im-
munity, it is likely that its role would be accepted. When the State De-
partment attempts to go beyond this and determine if a particular de-
fendant is the agent of a recognized sovereign government, so as likewise 
to be entitled to immunity, the courts and the legal scholars begin to 
question its authority.28 In the principal case the State Department not 
only determined that Czechoslovakia was entitled to sovereign immunity 
and that the State Bank was Czechoslovakia's agent, but it attempted to 
go one step farther and determine that the disputed property in the 
name of the State Bank was the property of Czechoslovakia. It was the 
last step that the court was unwilling to accept. Had the State Depart-
ment been able to determine conclusively that the property belonged to 
Czechoslovakia, it would have been effectively able to negate the law of 
New York concerning nationalized property. While the Constitution, laws, 
treaties and even executive agreements of the United States are the su-
preme law of the land and may override state policy and law,29 it would 
be unwarranted to give the State Department the power to override state 
law by the mere means of a suggestion of immunity. Yet this would have 
been the effect of the suggestion, if the court in the principal case had 
not rejected it. Although the State Department and the Czechoslovak 
government had been involved in negotiations with a view toward settling 
claims of United States citizens whose property had been confiscated after 
World War II,80 these negotiations had not ripened into a settlement 
which affected the title to the property in question. Had there been an 
executive agreement or a treaty, the State Department would have had 
a stronger basis for pre-empting the court in its disposition of the case. 
But in the absence of a formal treaty or executive agreement dealing with 
title to property,81 there would seem to be no constitutional basis for 
giving effect to the State Department suggestion.32 
The result in the principal case is an exemplary attempt to erect a 
judicial limitation on the State Department's control of litigation through 
the device of suggestions of immunity. In cases of infringement on areas 
definitely within state• courts' competence, the State Department should 
be foreclosed, unless it speaks with the authority of "supreme" federal law. 
Pragmatically, such limitations on State Department power would be 
27 See Mann, Judiciary and Executive in Foreign Affairs, 29 GROTIUS Soc'y TRANS. 
143 (1944): Dickinson, supra note 9, at 470-79. 
28 JESSUP, THE USES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 79-84 (1959); Cardozo, Sovereign Im-
munity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 608 (1954). 
29 U.S. CoNST. art. VI; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942): Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
80 Principal case at 118-19, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 135-36. 
81 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
82 See Note, 48 COLOM. L. R.Ev. 890, 899 n.60 (1948). 
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well-advised, since the Department is procedurally ill-equipped to handle 
involved problems of fact or law by means of full-scale hearings.33 More-
over, its preoccupation with questions of foreign policy could result in a 
misapplication of the very principles of international law which it 
espouses.34 If the boundaries erected by the court in the principal case 
are accepted, the way may then be open for a consideration of the ques• 
tion whether the State Department's inappropriateness as an adjudicatory 
body should also preclude it from determinations of particular defendants' 
rights to the claim of sovereign immunity. 
John A. Krsul, Jr., S.Ed. 
33 Cardozo, supra note 28. 
34 Drachsler, Some Obseroations on the Current Status of the Tate Letter, 54 AM. 
J. INT'L L. '790 (1960). 
